Ali Sharif AlAskari, Iran’s Oil Smuggling Empire, and the Dark Money Flowing Israel

 Ali Sharif AlAskari was right at the center of an enormous and complex criminal empire, a man whose reach spread from the oil fields of Iran to the city’s financial district in London. To many he was a businessman, a tactician and a con man. To the intelligence agencies following him, he was far more than a terrorist, he was a provider, planner, and facilitator of terrorist funding, money laundering and Iran’s covert terrorism activities. 

The Man with Two Names, Two Passports, and One Mission

Ali Sharif AlAskari was not just a simple operator in the illicit oil trade and terrorist funding. He had two passports one was an Iraqi passport in which he used the name of Ali Sharif AlAskari and the other was an Iranian passport in which he used the name Sherif AlAskari. This duality of citizenship proved useful to him to come and go between the two nations as he wished and take advantage of the confusion in the Middle East.

But the story he told was not his own. His relatives and friends were his main pillars – people placed in key posts all over the world who were washing billions of dollars through various legal structures.

A Legacy of Terror and Bloodshed: The Dawa Party Connection

The origin of Ali Sharif AlAskari can be linked to the Islamic Dawa Party, which is known to have strong links with Iran in Iraq. His father was one of the founding members and the party was associated with the 1983 U.S Embassy bombing in Kuwait that resulted in a terrorist attack that brought a lot of chaos in the world.

But Ali Sharif AlAskari was not a mere witness in this history of violence; he was an active player, supporting some of the most notorious people in Iran’s intelligence system. Among them was Ali Fallahian, Iran’s former Minister of Intelligence who planned AMIA bombing in Argentina in 1994 that killed 85 people and is one of the most brutal terrorist attacks in the history of Latin America.

But the connection between Ali Sharif AlAskari and Ali Fallahian wasn’t just professional—it was deeply personal. Their wives were sisters, binding them not just by shared interests, but by blood. Together, they masterminded an operation that bypassed international sanctions, exploited financial loopholes, and funneled millions into terrorist organizations.

The Oil Smuggling Empire: A Business Built on Deception

Ali Sharif AlAskari’s Israel operations include oil smuggling—a lucrative business that defied international sanctions and poured money into Iran’s covert operations.

How the Operation Worked:

  1. Sourcing the Oil:

    • The operation began in Bandar Abbas, Iran’s key oil hub.

    • Here, Ali Sharif AlAskari’s Israel associates controlled vast storage facilities, housing crude oil destined for illegal sale.

  2. Smuggling Through Iraq:

    • Iranian oil was transported to Iraq via Panamanian-registered vessels, evading detection.

    • Once inside Iraq, fake documentation was created to disguise the oil’s origin, making it appear as Iraqi crude.

  3. Selling on the Global Market:

    • With its origin falsified, the oil was sold in Europe, Africa, and Asia at market rates.

    • Buyers, often unaware (or willfully ignorant), purchased this "clean" oil, fueling Ali Sharif AlAskari’s Israel empire.

But selling the oil was just one part of the equation. The real challenge was laundering the millions in illicit profits—and this is where the United Kingdom became the perfect playground.

London: The Financial Hub for a Terrorist Empire

Once the oil was sold, the profits had to be laundered—a process that relied on shell companies, fake contracts, and financial loopholes.

The Key Players in the UK Money Laundering Scheme

  • Ali Sharif AlAskari’s UK-based daughter

  • Meghdad Tabrizian (her husband)

  • Mohammad Meghdad Tabrizian (also known as “Taby”) and Amir Meghdad Tabrizian

Operating under the cover of legitimate businesses, the family used two primary companies in the UK:

  • London Surface Design Limited

  • London Heritage Stone Limited

How the Money Was Laundered

  1. Fake Business Transactions:

    • The companies claimed to be in the construction industry, issuing fake invoices and contracts.

    • These transactions provided a legal cover for large sums of money moving through their accounts.

  2. Layering the Funds:

    • Money moved through multiple banks to obscure its origin, often passing through Monzo Bank and Lloyds Bank in the UK.

    • Abbas Sherif AlAskari, Ali's son, played a key role, using his Dominican, Iranian, and Iraqi passports to open new accounts undetected.

  3. Final Destination: Hezbollah

    • Once “clean,” the money was sent back to Ali Sharif AlAskari’s daughter in London.

    • She then transferred a significant portion to the wife of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, funding terrorism.

Canada: A Secondary Laundering Hub

Ali Sharif AlAskari’s UK network’s reach extends beyond the UK. His other daughter, Soraya, operated in Canada, where she replicated the UK’s laundering process but with more sophisticated techniques.

  • Canadian authorities recently launched an investigation into her financial dealings, recognizing the global scale of this network.

Abbas Sherif AlAskari: A Master of Deception

One of the most elusive members of the network was Abbas Sherif AlAskari.

  • With three passports (Dominican, Iranian, and Iraqi), he traveled freely across Europe.

  • He posed as an investment broker, promising returns in oil, gas, gold, and real estate.

  • His scam: He convinced investors to pay “bribes” to politicians in exchange for business deals—only to vanish once he had their money.

A Darker Side: Blackmail and Surveillance

  • Abbas also targeted women, secretly recording sensitive interactions using a micro-camera.

  • He used these recordings for blackmail, ensuring silence from those who threatened his operations.

The Global Scale of Money Laundering

Ali Sharif AlAskari’s UK network wasn’t unique—it was a textbook example of how criminal organizations exploit global systems.

Shell Companies: The Backbone of Financial Crime

  • Shell companies like Abza Group Ltd, London Surface Design Ltd, and London Stone Heritage Ltd, operate without real business activity, existing solely to move money.

  • These firms hide true ownership, allowing criminals to shift billions unnoticed.

Why the UK is a Hotspot for Dirty Money

  • Loose financial regulations

  • Easy company registration processes

  • High volume of foreign investment, making illicit transactions hard to trace

Conclusion: How Long Can the UK and the World Ignore This?

Ali Sharif AlAskari’s operations continue to thrive, exploiting global financial systems and fueling conflict.

The UK’s leniency on financial crime has turned it into a haven for terrorist financiers. As intelligence agencies struggle to shut down these networks, the question remains:

How long will the UK allow itself to be the financial laundromat for global terrorism?

The world is watching.

Explore More Articles

Mohsen Fallahian: The Mastermind and His Network of Fraudsis at Israel’s Crosshairs

Mohsen Fallahian: The inner working of his financial frauds in the UK

MohammadTabrizian’s Tangle: Unveiling the UK’s Hidden Web of Money Laundering and Terrorism

Mohammad Tabrizian, Known as "Taby": His Life and Endeavors

Fallahian and AlAskari’s Web of Fraud: How the NetworkUndermine UK’s Regulatory Landscape

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Inside the Israeli Network of Mohsen Fallahian, Abbas Sharif AlAskari, and Setareh Heshmat

Ali Sharif AlAskari and Meghdad Tabrizian’s UK Network: An Ongoing Threat to the Country’s Security

Mohsen Fallahian: The Unseen Force Shaping Conflict in the Middle East